[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce . . . any requirement respecting any claim . . . made in the label or labeling of food that is not identical to the requirement . . . of this title.
Defendant persuasively argues that Plaintiff's lawsuit seeks to impose requirements that are not identical to th[e] regulatory scheme. First, Plaintiff apparently seeks to forbid General Mills from labeling its product “Total Blueberry Pomegranate,” even though such descriptions of “characterizing flavor” are expressly authorized by federal law. Second, Plaintiff appears to demand that General Mills affirmatively state on the package that the cereal “does not actually contain blueberries or pomegranates,” even though FDA regulations would not require this. Third, Plaintiff objects to the depiction of brown colored “clusters” that (according to Plaintiff) allegedly “resemble blueberries and/or pomegranate seeds,” even though FDA regulations would have permitted General Mills to depict even fresh blueberries and pomegranates on its box.
Congress and the FDA have thoroughly regulated the manner in which ingredients must be listed on packages, including specifying how oil products must be labeled. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(i)(2); 21 CFR § 101.4(b)(14). Entering an order of the type Briseno seeks would impose a requirement that is not identical to federal law, and his prayer for such relief is thus preempted.
[P]rimary jurisdiction is properly invoked when a claim is cognizable in federal court but requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or of a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency.