In any event, let's all agree that the allure of preemption is undeniable. It makes claims go away completely. No muss, no fuss. No need to worry about bad science, bad documents, or bad experts. So it is no marvel that the defendant sought dismissal of the case on grounds of preemption. But the ceramic femoral head is a Class II medical device. We lost that issue in Lohr years ago. So it is also no marvel that the court rejected the preemption argument, even if the court garbled the law in getting there. For instance, the court held that the plaintiff's strict liability claims "are not, at base, claims for violation of federal law." Marcum, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62875 at *10. Okay. So what? Instead, "Plaintiff’s claims in question are that Defendant breached well-recognized state law duties owed to her through conduct that is also a violation of federal law, and these claims are therefore not preempted by Buckman." Id. We'll confess that we are not sure what the court means by that. Is this an invocation of the "parallel" claim exception, even though, like we said, this isn't a PMA device? That word nowhere appears in the decision. Look, there probably was not going to be preemption for this 510(k) cleared product anyway, but now we have some baffling, ugly language that will be cited in cases where there might actually be a vigorous preemption claim. We can think of arguing preemption in a case where a plaintiff is challenging the 510(k) status of a product, where the plaintiff argues that the clearance process is illegitimate, or that the manufacturer should have insisted on going the PMA route, or that the manufacturer should have engaged in testing above and beyond that required by the 510(k) clearance process. Otherwise, don't lead with your chin, not on a defense as precious as preemption. We'd like to think those valid preemption arguments are not foreclosed by the court's reasoning in Marcum, but we're not certain what that reasoning is or what argument by the defendant provoked such reasoning.